The full form of VVPAT is Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, or VVPAT, is a paperless independent record of the electronic voting system. It is a technique for giving voters feedback in a voting system without a ballot. Through a printer port, the VVPAT is linked to the EVM, recording vote data and counters on a paper slip to confirm the EVM's accurate recording of the vote. Voters can verify their ballots before casting them, which reduces the possibility of fraud and rigging. The EVM cannot be touched by any registered voter unless a ballot has been cast on their behalf.
The VVPAT is useful for vision-challenged voters, illiterate voters, and aged people who are not able to read or write to ensure that their votes are cast accurately on EVMs before they lose the opportunity to later question it.
EVM has some limitations in its application due to its weight or other factors, but VVPAT can be utilized in places where EVM cannot be. Additionally, this system of paper trails makes it impossible for anyone to escape their responsibilities under the Electoral Act.
The main benefits of a VVPAT are given as:
The electronic vote is simpler to audit thanks to VVPATs. They enable officials and voters to independently confirm that all ballots were cast as intended and that the outcomes of the election are legitimate.
Increased auditability increases transparency, which fosters trust.
To ensure the accuracy of the data in the system, the paper trail's redundancy is essential.
VVPATs give authorities and access to tangible and transparent proof in cases when results are challenged. They can also aid in the detection of errors or unethical attempts to influence the outcome.
Every time new technology is being used, a leap of faith is necessary.
Voting becomes more like traditional voting when there is a tangible paper trail that the voter may touch.
Election costs in India have increased as a result of (Electronic Voting Machine) EVM, however, if VVPAT is being used, costs will decrease. The VVPAT system will also aid in preventing the use of EVMs in foreign elections. Paper trails will be used in international elections to ensure that EVMs are not tampered with. By doing this, potentially devastating outcomes from the UN, EU, or any other international election might be avoided.
Typical VVPAT issues include:
Voter behaviors seen on camera during a real election show that most people do not read the VVPAT before casting their ballots.
According to research, voters who review ballot summaries tend to ignore discrepancies.
Most candidates seeking a manual VVPAT recount or audit are probably unable to afford it because it is time-consuming and costly.
Even though VVPAT is intended to act as a check on DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) vote recorders, it nevertheless uses the same technology and proprietary software to generate the audit trail.
The performance and authority of the audit are additional challenges in the introduction of paper audit trails. Electronic voting systems with paper auditing capabilities are more expensive, more challenging to design, frequently need specialist external hardware, and are sometimes challenging to use.
Malicious software can cause a VVPAT system to intentionally record the voter's choices incorrectly. By rigging the results solely for lesser-known races or a tiny portion of the votes, this assault could reduce the chance of detection.
A VVPAT may print without any voters watching the paper trail, which would be a sort of ballot stuffing, which is another security risk. It would be hard to separate valid votes from fraudulent ones, even if more votes were found through matching to the voters’ list.
Privacy concerns
Reel-to-reel DRE VVPAT systems, which print out ballot records in the order they were cast, create privacy concerns if the order of voting may also be recorded. This issue can be avoided by using VVPAT printers that cut the paper after each ballot to form individual ballots. It would be more challenging to match the entire voter list and the VVPATs if there were several voting machines.
Alternately, a potential attacker may observe how individuals utilize a specific voting system and record the sequence in which each vote he is interested in was made. If the attacker later came into possession of the paper ballot records, she might compare the two and endanger the confidentiality of the vote. Additionally, this can result in voter intimidation and vote selling.
Effectiveness concerns
In order to "verify" the vote, voters must check the paper audit before casting a ballot, which is another issue. A voter may find comfort in the ability to examine the paper, but the VVPAT is ineffective as a safeguard against error or fraud unless a statistically significant percentage of voters participate.
Implementation concerns
Implementing a VVPAT as an after-the-fact feature can be substantially more challenging. Due to the specific external hardware needed, implementation can be expensive to install and difficult to deploy for jurisdictions currently employing direct recording electronic voting machines that do not have a VVPAT. A jurisdiction would have to use a no-bid, sole-source purchase contract to buy the system created by the vendor of the DRE machine in order to add a VVPAT component to a DRE machine. That is presuming the seller created a part that works with the current DRE machine. It's possible that the vendor didn't provide a VVPAT component that works with the DRE machine in use, necessitating the jurisdiction's purchase of a brand-new voting system.
The installation of a new voting system that incorporates a VVPAT component would present fewer implementation difficulties for jurisdictions that do not currently use direct recording electronic voting machines. Some VVPAT solutions are extremely error-prone and place a heavy cognitive burden on the voter.
Interesting facts about VVPAT
Some interesting facts about VVPAT are described below:
Before being automatically cut and dropped into the sealed drop box of the VVPAT, the VVPAT slip is shown for 7 seconds.
Typically, it takes an hour to count one VVPAT vote.
A printer and a VVPAT Status Display Unit make up the VVPAT (VSDU).
No. VVPAT operates on a power backup i.e., a battery of around 15 volts.
Authorized engineers and manufacturers from Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) perform first-level checking of the VVPAT.
For the first time, the VVPATs with EVMs were utilized in a bye-election from the 51-Noksen (ST) assembly constituency of Nagaland.
No, VVPAT is not a separate voting machine. It is attached to the EVM.
With the assistance of the manufacturer's engineers, ECIL/BEL, the VVPAT unit is loaded with serial numbers, names of candidates, and symbols allotted to them.